Learning AI Attacks – A Red Team Perspective


Phase 1: Foundation – Understanding the AI Attack Surface

Objective: Build baseline knowledge of how AI systems (especially LLMs and generative models) function and where vulnerabilities lie.

Topics:

  • What is an LLM and how does it work? (e.g., GPT, Claude, Gemini)
  • AI model components: Prompt → Context → Output
  • Common use cases where LLMs are embedded (chatbots, agents, automation, dev tools)
  • Key threats: Prompt injection, data poisoning, model theft, jailbreaks, indirect prompt injection

Red Team Exercise:

  • Set up an open-source LLM (e.g., OpenAssistant, LLaMA2) in a test environment.
  • Interact with prompts and understand how responses are generated.

Phase 2: Prompt Injection – The Entry Point for Attacks

Objective: Learn how attackers manipulate inputs to alter the behavior of the AI model.

Topics:

  • Direct prompt injection: Overriding instructions (e.g., “Ignore all previous instructions and do X…”)
  • Indirect prompt injection: Injection through external sources (webpages, PDFs, plugins)
  • Real-world scenarios: Attacking AI assistants with poisoned email or file input

Red Team Exercise:

  • Craft and test direct prompt injections on open models (e.g., instruct the model to reveal confidential rules).
  • Perform indirect injection using embedded prompts in HTML or Google Docs.

Mitigation Strategies:

  • Prompt escaping and input sanitization
  • Output filtering and content moderation
  • Model instruction layering (prefix/postfix locking)

Phase 3: Jailbreaks – Bypassing Guardrails

Objective: Learn how red teams bypass restrictions enforced by safety layers.

Techniques:

  • Roleplay exploitation: e.g., “Let’s pretend this is a scene in a movie…”
  • Encoding prompts (base64, morse code) and asking the model to decode
  • Token smuggling and Unicode abuse
  • Chain-of-thought abuse: Stepping the model into illegal content indirectly

Red Team Exercise:

  • Use jailbreak prompts (e.g., DAN, Sydney, Classic Mode) to test different LLMs.
  • Create a library of failed and successful jailbreaks.

Prevention Strategies:

  • Fine-tuning with adversarial examples
  • Rate-limiting and logging suspicious input patterns
  • Multi-stage safety filters (intent detection + content moderation)

Phase 4: Monitoring and Detection

Objective: Deploy security visibility around AI usage to detect abnormal behavior.

Techniques:

  • Capture logs of prompts and outputs for forensic review
  • Anomaly detection with NLP models (e.g., looking for abuse patterns in logs)
  • Guardrail breach detection (e.g., model gave an unauthorized answer)

Red Team Exercise:

  • Simulate adversarial activity and validate if the system logs and alerts are triggered.
  • Tag and classify outputs as benign or potentially harmful.

Monitoring Tools:

  • Humanloop, Weights & Biases for prompt observability
  • AWS Bedrock Guardrails or Azure AI Content Filters
  • Internal regex/ML-based monitors for prompt/output inspection

Phase 5: Defense in Depth – Hardening AI Systems

Objective: Implement a comprehensive strategy to prevent misuse.

Hardening Steps:

  1. Input Sanitization: Reject prompts with malicious patterns or encodings.
  2. Contextual Access Control: Restrict models from having open access to untrusted sources.
  3. Prompt Templates: Use locked templates with variable slots.
  4. Model Choice: Use fine-tuned, smaller models for sensitive functions.
  5. Red Team Simulations: Regular attack simulations to test guardrails and monitoring.

Exercise:

  • Build a “Red Team Kill Chain” for AI systems.
  • Run tabletop simulations involving multiple AI components (e.g., web + LLM + user input).

Bonus Phase: Emerging Threats in AI

Stay updated on evolving risks:

  • Model extraction via APIs
  • Adversarial fine-tuning
  • Prompt chaining exploits in agents
  • Supply chain risks in pretrained models

Recommended Tools & Platforms for Practice

  • [OpenAI Playground / API Logs]
  • [Replicate.com – Run models in a sandbox]
  • [LMQL, LangChain – For building/test harnesses]
  • [Zama.ai, MithrilSecurity – For confidential computing on AI]
  • [AutoGPT/AgentGPT – Red teaming agents]

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